Does Governance Explain Unofficial Activity? by James May et al.
“Does Governance Explain Unofficial Activity?”
by
James W. May, William H. Pyle and Paul M. Sommers
June, 2002













JEL #: O17, P263
Does Governance Explain Unofficial Activity?
A proliferation of indices on tax rates, measures of regulation, the legal environment,
and corruption with widely differing scales have been used by Johnson et al. (1998) and
Friedman et al. (2000), among others, to explain differences in unofficial activity across a
sample of between 32 and 69 countries.  Recently, the World Bank released a new database
containing over 300 governance indicators compiled from a variety of sources.  Kaufmann
et al. (1999) organized a subset of these governance indicators into six “clusters” or more
broadly defined categories.  In a cross-section of the same 69 countries examined by
Friedman et al. (2000), we provide new empirical evidence of the importance of governance
to unofficial activity in non-transition economies (notably, OECD countries).  Surprisingly,
the association between better governance and less unofficial activity is weak in transition
economies and weaker still in Latin American countries.
Estimates of the share of the unofficial economy of 69 countries (18 of which are
transition or post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) are
from Friedman et al. (2000; Table 1, base estimate (share 1), pp. 466-468).  All six
aggregate governance indicators (at www.worldbank.org/research/growth) discussed below
are measured on the same scale, from –2.5 to +2.5.  The measure is higher (that is, closer to
+2.5) in economies that discourage unofficial activity.  Thus one would expect an inverse
relationship between any one of the six governance indicators and the share of the unofficial
economy as a percentage of GDP.4
The first of the six governance indicators used as an independent variable is “Voice
and Accountability”.  This measure is higher for countries that hold those in authority
accountable for their actions.  The higher the measure, the more widespread are civil
liberties and political rights.  “Political Instability and Violence” measures the perceived
likelihood of unconstitutional or violent changes in government.  These first two clusters
therefore summarize key aspects of the process by which those in authority are selected and
replaced.
“Government Effectiveness” is a catchall variable for the quality of public services,
the competence of civil servants, and the independence of the civil service from political
pressure.  “Regulatory Burden” measures the incidence of policies that are not perceived as
business-friendly, such as price controls and inadequate bank supervision.  These two
clusters capture the capacity of the nation-state to produce and implement sound public
policies.
“Rule of Law” seeks to measure the extent to which the public has confidence in and
abides by the rules of society.  Enforceable contracts and a strong judiciary form the basis
for market-friendly interactions.  “Graft” measures the public’s perception of corruption,
that is, the exercise of public power for private gain.  These last two clusters capture the
respect of citizens for the rules which govern their interactions.
The averages for transition economies and non-transition economies for each of the six
governance indicators are reported in Table 1.  The differences between the two groups of
countries are greatest for “Government Effectiveness” and “Graft”.  For “Political
Instability”, the differences are significant at only the 10 percent level.5
Strong differences emerge between transition and non-transition economies when the
unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP is regressed on each of the six governance
indicators, one at a time.  The regression results in Table 2 underscore the importance of
governance indicators as determinants of unofficial activity in non-transition economies
alone.  A one-point increase in the “Regulatory Burden” index, for example, is associated
with a dramatic 31.6 percent decrease in the share of the unofficial economy of non-
transition economies.  (Recall that increases in any one of the governance indices are
business-friendly and hence discourage movement “underground”.)  The same one-point
increase in the “Regulatory Burden” index is associated with a much smaller (7.8 percent)
decrease in the share of the unofficial economy of transition economies.  “Political
Instability” and “Graft” alone are significant at explaining variation in the relative size of
the unofficial economy of governments in transition.
The regional regression results in Table 3 show that the significant results earlier
reported for non-transition economies largely depend on the presence of OECD countries in
our sample.  Governance does not appear to matter for Latin American countries.  The
remaining sixteen countries in the sample of 51 non-transition economies include eight
Asian countries, four from the Middle East or North Africa, and four from Sub-Saharan
Africa.  All three other groups are thus too small to provide meaningful regional
comparisons.
In summary, the relationship between share of the unofficial economy in non-
transition economies and governance is strong for each of the six basic governance
concepts.  However, governance, as measured by these indicators, matters little for
transition economies, save for “Graft” and “Political Instability”.6
Concluding Remarks
The cross-country results presented here show that most aspects of governance affect
transition and non-transition economies differently.  For governments in transition, more
regulation, greater voice and accountability, heightened government effectiveness, and
stronger rule of law surprisingly matter very little.  What matters most for these transition
economies is political stability (that is, the ability of citizens to peacefully select and replace
those in power) and insulating the country’s business environment from corruption.7
Table 1.  Six Aggregate Governance Indicators,




(n =18) (n = 51) difference
Governance between
Indicator min max average min max average averages
______________________________________________________________________________
Voice and Uzbekistan Czech Rep .174 Nigeria Switzerland .685 .022
Accountability (-1.343) (1.201) (-1.234) (1.694)
Political Georgia Hungary .181 Sri Lanka Switzerland .478 .10
Instability (-0.761) (1.245) (-1.628) (1.690)
Government Uzbekistan Poland -.279 Nigeria Singapore .633 <.0001
Effectiveness (-1.305) (0.674) (-1.321) (2.082)
Regulatory Belarus Hungary -.109 Nigeria Singapore .659 .0004
Burden (-1.466) (0.854) (-0.352) (1.245)
Rule Belarus Hungary -.121 Guatemala Switzerland .640 .0001
of Law (-0.876) (0.706) (-1.106) (1.996)
Graft Azerbaijan Hungary -.318 Paraguay Denmark .620 <.0001
(-0.998) (0.614) (-0.958) (2.129)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________8
Table 2.  Regressions of Unofficial Economy (as % of GDP)
on Governance Indicators,
Transition and Non-Transition Economies
_________________________________________________________________________
Transition Economies Non-Transition Economies
Governance





Voice and 30.03 -7.92 .123 40.04 -17.44 .548
Accountability (7.46)** (-1.50) (16.86)** (-7.70)**
Political 31.69 -16.74 .312 35.97 -16.51 .495
Instability (8.68)** (-2.69)* (16.23)** (-6.93)**
Government 25.45 -11.49 .157 38.39 -16.28 .570
Effectiveness (5.97)** (-1.73) (17.70)** (-8.07)**
Regulatory 27.80 -7.78 .108 48.94 -31.64 .380
Burden (6.95)** (-1.39) (11.26)** (-5.48)**
Rule 26.97 -13.98 .180 38.24 -15.87 .579
of Law (6.93)** (-1.88) (17.95)** (-8.21)**
Graft 23.17 -17.25 .300 36.99 -14.45 .586
(5.68)** (-2.62)* (18.25)** (-8.32)**
_________________________________________________________________________
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
*Denotes significant at 5% level.
**Denotes significant at 1% level.9
Table 3.  Regressions of Unofficial Economy (as % of GDP)
on Governance Indicators,
OECD and Latin American Countries
_________________________________________________________________________
OECD (n = 20) Latin America (n = 15)
Governance





Voice and 41.43 -19.72 .426 39.74 -7.80 .082
Accountability (5.24)** (-3.66)** (9.47)** (-1.07)
Political 22.93 -9.16 .445 36.60 -8.03 .090
Instability (8.04)** (-3.80)** (9.02)** (-1.13)
Government 26.91 -9.99 .521 37.57 -6.86 .070
Effectiveness (8.08)** (-4.42)** (9.57)** (-0.99)
Regulatory 28.62 -17.29 .298 35.02 5.35 .014
Burden (4.89)** (-2.76)* (4.30)** (0.42)
Rule 28.48 -11.47 .713 34.34 -12.00 .232
of Law (11.59)** (-6.68)** (8.58)** (-1.98)
Graft 23.32 -6.78 .309 35.34 -9.33 .132
(6.00)** (-2.84)* (8.37)** (-1.41)
__________________________________________________________________________
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
*Denotes significant at 5% level.
**Denotes significant at 1% level.10
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